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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether Maxfield carried his burden of proving 
that there are special and important reasons for the Supreme 
Court to grant his petition for a Writ of Certiorari. 
II, Whether the Utah Court of Appeals used the correct 
standards of review in reaching the decision to sustain the trial 
court's decision and findings and conclusions. 
III. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied 
Rule 41(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure in involuntarily 
dismissing Maxfield's case at pretrial for failure to timely 
prosecute and whether that was an appropriate exercise of 
judicial discretion. 
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Maxfield v. Rushton7 et al., 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 33 (CA 
8/25/89) P.2d . 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
The following statutes and rules are controlling: 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 43 
46 
47(e) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 40(b) 
41(b) 
(See Appendix) 
v 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari from a 
decision from the Court of Appeals sustaining the trial court's 
dismissal of the cause of action of Maxfield in a case Maxfield 
v. Rushton for the failure at pretrial of Maxfield to be prepared 
to try the case on September 15, 1987, on a matter that was filed 
initially in October 1980. The trial court determined that the 
dismissal on the case in chief was for the failure of the 
plaintiff to timely prosecute the matter. 
The issue before the Supreme Court is whether the 
Supreme Court, under its authority under Rule 43, should grant 
the petition of appellant before the court as well as to 
determine if there is an important or special reason under the 
judicial discretion of the Supreme Court to grant the writ, 
recognizing it would only be done in the following cases: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision in conflict with a 
decision of another panel of the Court of 
Appeals on the same issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
decided a question of state or federal law in 
a way that is in conflict with a decision of 
this court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision that has so far departed 
from the accepted and usual course of 
judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned 
such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of this court's power of 
supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an 
important question of municipal, state, or 
federal law which has not been, but should 
be, settled by this court. 
STATEMENT OF FACT^ 
The state of Utah obtained a judgment against a 
predecessor in interest to real property owned by Mr. Reed 
Maxfield. After the state executed on the real property, 
Maxfield filed suit in 1980 in Utah District Court against Owen 
and Carol Rushton, who had purchased the property at the 
sheriff's sale. Maxfield alleged that the Rushtons had 
wrongfully deprived him of his property by purchasing it through 
an illegal sheriff's sale. The Rushtons subsequently filed a 
third-party complaint against the state of Utah, seeking 
reimbursement of the purchase price of the property if the court 
should find in Maxfield's favor. 
The ensuing litigation continued through the next seven 
years, during which time Maxfield amended his complaint twice and 
attempted to amend it a third time, moved three times for summary 
judgment, filed an interlocutory appeal appealing the trial 
court's denial of his motion for summary judgment, objected to 
trial dates on three occasions on the ground that he wished to 
amend his complaint, and retained three different attorneys. 
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During this time Maxfield filed no certificates of readiness for 
trial. 
At a pretrial hearing in 1987, Maxfield moved to 
continue the trial date. The trial court denied the motion and 
ordered Maxfield's action dismissed for failure to timely 
prosecute, finding that Maxfield had been dilatory in prosecuting 
his case. On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, the trial 
court's order was affirmed. The Court of Appeals found that 
Maxfield's conduct had been dilatory and that despite the 
prodigious number of motions filed by him, "little or nothing 
that Maxfield did after filing his initial complaint served to 
move the case along." 
Maxfield now petitions the Utah Supreme Court for a 
writ of certiorari, claiming the Utah Court of Appeals erred in 
affirming the trial court's dismissal of his case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PETITIONER HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED A 
SPECIAL OR COMPELLING REASON FOR THE 
COURT TO REVIEW THIS CASE. 
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Supreme Court clearly 
outline the character of reasons that the court will consider in 
granting a petition for Writ of Certiorari. Maxfield has not 
alleged that the decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict 
with prior decisions of this court. Since there is no conflict 
of law requiring a settlement of legal issues by the Supreme 
Court, there is no need for the court to disturb the reasoning of 
the Court of Appeals in deciding this case. 
Petitioner has not alleged that the Court of Appeals 
decided a question of state or federal law in a way which 
conflicts with the decision of this court. Indeed, such an 
assertion would be unlikely inasmuch as the Court of Appeals 
specifically followed the holding of this dourt in Maxfield v. 
Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323, 1324-25, (Utah 1975). 
The appellant has not alleged that the Court of Appeals 
rendered a decision that so far departed from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned 
such departure by a lower court as to call for an exercise of the 
powers of supervision residing in the Supreme Court. 
The appellant/petitioner, does not claim that this case 
presents important questions of state law Which should be decided 
by the Supreme Court rather than the Court of Appeals. Maxfield 
simply alleges that the Court of Appeals applied an incorrect 
standard of review to the case, but does not urge upon this court 
a previous constitutional claim. 
While reasons outlined in Rule 43, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure are neither controlling or limiting as to the type of 
discretion the court can exercise in considering a petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, they are certainly indicative of those areas 
that should concern the court when considering taking action in a 
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case previously assigned for determination by that court to a 
lower appellate court. 
Maxfield does not make any argument in support of his 
petition that in any way approaches the threshold this court must 
employ when deciding to grant a discretionary petition for writ 
of certiorari. Maxfield's argument contains inaccurate 
statements of fact and emotional pleas that this court may ignore 
and do not justify a reversal of the Court of Appeals because 
Maxfield fears he will suffer financial loss from the dismissal 
with prejudice by the trial court wherein the trial court ruled 
Maxfield was dilatory and failed to timely prosecute the case. 
(See page 3, footnote 1, Opinion of the Court of Appeals.) The 
Court of Appeals further said at page 4 of their opinion, last 
three lines, "After a thorough review of the record, we find that 
Maxfield was dilatory in prosecuting the case." 
Maxfield's plea to this court is clearly an attempt to 
escape from the long delayed consequences of his actions and his 
inactions rather than an appeal for relief from any error of law 
allegedly perpetrated by the Court of Appeals upon him. It is 
important to note the Court of Appeals said further, "Such non-
action is inexcusable, not only from the standpoint of the 
parties, but also because it constitutes an abuse of the judicial 
process." 
II. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE 
CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW IN DECIDING 
THE APPEAL BEFORE IT. 
A. The Court of Appeals fully examined the record on 
the appeal and the appellants' arguments (1) that the court erred 
in dismissing the action for failure to prosecute; (2) refusing 
to grant summary judgment in favor of Maxfield; and (3) in 
refusing to either void the sheriff's sale or grant Maxfield the 
immediate right to redeem the properties and held that sustaining 
Point 1 was dispositive, therefore there was no need to address 
appellant's arguments 2 and 3. 
The Court of Appeals examined the appeal from the Third 
District Court's Memorandum Decision and Judgment of Dismissal 
and determined that the court's action was not an abuse of 
discretion. At page 4 in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, 
first paragraph, Judge Garff states: 
It is well established that the trial 
court may, on its own motion, dismiss an 
action for want of prosecution under Rule 
41(b). Brahser Motor & Fin. Co. v. Brown, 23 
Utah 2d 247, 461 P.2d 464, 464-65 (1969); 
Charlie Brown Constr. Co* v. Leisure Sports 
Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). This authority is an "'inherent 
power,' governed not by rule or statute but 
by the control necessarily vested in courts 
to manage their own affairs so as to achieve 
the orderly and expeditious disposition of 
case." Charlie Brown Constr. Co., 740 P.2d 
at 1370 (quoting Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 
U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962). Therefore, the 
trial court has "a reasonable latitude of 
discretion in dismissing for failure to 
prosecute if a party fails to move forward 
-£_ 
according to the rules and the directions of 
the court, without justifiable excuse." 
Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. 
Larsen Contractor Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 878-79 
(Utah 1975) (footnote omitted). 
Consequently, a lower court's dismissal of a 
case under Rule 41(b) will not be disturbed 
on appeal unless it is clear from the record 
that it has abused its discretion. Wilson v. 
Lambert, 613 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1980); 
Department of Social Servs. v. Romero, 609 
P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980); Reliance Nat. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Caine, 555 P.2d 276, 277 
(Utah 1976); Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 
29 Utah 2d 259, 508 P.2d 528, 529 (1973). 
B. The Court of Appeals correctly applied Rule 41(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to the case and correctly 
dismissed Maxfield's cause of action for "failure to timely 
prosecute the case." In Judge Orme's concurring opinion, he 
states: 
Sua sponte dismissal for failure to 
prosecute is usually not appropriate except 
when it follows a substantial period of 
complete inactivity. It would be an 
extraordinary case where such a dismissal 
would be appropriate with trial scheduled in 
just a few days, especially following a 
flurry of motion activity. While the 
question is a closer one for me than the main 
opinion may suggest, I am persuaded this is 
that extraordinary case. 
In my view, what saves the dismissal in 
this case from crossing into the realm of 
abused discretion is this: Maxfield's latest 
counsel's motion for leave to withdraw 
coupled with his motion for leave to file yet 
another amended complaint constituted, taken 
together, a concession by Maxfield that he 
was nowhere near being ready to try his case 
in a matter of a few days even though the 
action had been pending for the better part 
of a decade. It is the length of time this 
action had been pending coupled with 
Maxfield's obvious unreadiness that make sua 
sponte dismissal appropriate in this case. 
(Emphas i s added.) 
Maxfield, the petitioner/appellant, continues to 
attempt to place before the court an erroneous and untrue fact 
stated in paragraph 20 on page 12 of his petition for a writ of 
certiorari. This assertion is that Maxfield was "ready and 
willing to proceed with trial when Judge Young entered an Order 
of Dismissal." However, in the briefs themselves and at argument 
bef ore the Court of Appeals, this fact was rejected as false by 
both the Rushtons and the State of Utah. T|he Court of Appeals 
correctly picked up on that dispute, resolving in the favor of 
the Rushtons and the State by stating in paragraph 4 at page 2 of 
the opinion of the appellate court, "On May 18, 1987, Maxfield 
filed a pro se objection to the trial setting on the grounds that 
he was incapable of handling this case himself and that he was in 
the process of seeking new counsel." This point was argued at 
the pretrial in August 1987 by the State and by Rushtons and it 
was apparent to Judge Young of the trial court that if Maxfield 
was incapable of handling the case alone in May without an 
attorney, he was equally incapable of handling the case without 
an attorney on September 15, 1987, the date of the trial, and the 
court correctly dismissed the matter in total under Rule 41(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for Maxfield's "failure to 
timely prosecute the case." 
C. The Court of Appeals correctly applied the 
"reasonable and rational" standard of review and weighed its 
discretion against a balancing of that with giving disputants an 
opportunity to be heard and do justice between them; then 
sustaining the trial court's Findings of Fact and rule of law. 
The Court of Appeals correctly applied reason and judgment in 
review of the case pursuant to the criteria enunciated in the 
Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. case, 544 P.2d at 879. The 
court noted that it is not merely the lapse of time, but also 
those additional five factors: (1) The conduct of both parties; 
(2) the opportunity for each party to move the case forward; (3) 
what each of the parties has done to move the case forward; (4) 
the difficulty or prejudice that may be caused to the other side; 
and (5) whether injustice may result from the dismissal. Citing 
K.L.C. Inc. v. McLean, 656 P.2d 986, 988 (Utah 1982); Utah Oil 
Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1977). As the record 
was reviewed by the Court of Appeals measuring the conduct of 
both parties against the five factors in the Westinghouse case, 
the court found (1) that Maxfield's conduct was dilatory whereas 
defendants attempted to move the case along; (2) that Maxfield's 
behavior was more dilatory than the defendants'; (3) that 
Maxfield did little or nothing after filing the complaint and the 
second amended complaint to move the case along, whereas the 
defendants did make attempts to move the case forward; (4) the 
appellate court pointed out that the loss 0f the alleged 
Maxfield's property interest (already assigned to a corporate 
entity through the bankruptcy proceeding) does not outweigh the 
potential damage to the defendants' case for inability to obtain 
witnesses and properly prosecute the case after such a long 
delay; and (5) that the case of the petitioner/appellant Maxfield 
in total view simply leaves a case where there was ample 
opportunity for him to prove his case but the record shows that 
he simply failed to do so, concluding "such nonaction is 
inexcusable not only from the standpoint of the parties but also 
because it constitutes abuse of the judicial process." 
D. Rule 47(e) of the Supreme Court Rules states that 
petitioner's brief for writ of certiorari must "present with 
accuracy, brevity and clarity whatever is essential to a ready 
and adequate understanding of the points requiring 
consideration." It is further pointed out that a failure to do 
so may be a sufficient reason in and of itself for denying a 
petition for certiorari. The petitioner/appellant points out two 
issues justifying review by this court: (1) Whether the Court of 
Appeals erred in not ruling on petitioner's argument that he was 
entitled to summary judgment; and (2) whether the Court of 
Appeals erred in affirming the trial court'$ dismissal of 
petitioner's case for failure to timely prosecute the action. It 
is apparent from the opinion that the Court of Appeals 
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specifically declined to address the first issue inasmuch as the 
rule sustaining the trial court's dismissal for failure to timely 
prosecute the cause of action was dispositive of the case. (See 
page 7 of the Court of Appeals brief.) In this case, the Court 
of Appeals properly declined to reach an issue which it was not 
required to reach. C.F. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 
(1936) (Justice Brandeis concurring), wherein it outlined the 
principles under which the Supreme Court avoids passing upon 
constitutional issues. 
CONCLUSION 
Clearly the facts in this case as set forth in the 
record and analyzed by the Court of Appeals sustain the decision 
that this case was properly handled and there was ample 
justification, considering all factors, for a dismissal of the 
case on its merits for failure to timely prosecute. (See Utah 
Supreme Court decisions: K.L.C. v. McLean 656 P.2d 986 (Utah 
1982); Utah Dept. of Trans, v. Hatch, 613 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980); 
Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977); Reliance Nat'l 
Life Ins. v. Caine, 555 P.2d 277 (Utah 1976); Westinqhouse 
Electric Supp. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 
(Utah 1975); Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975); 
Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 508 P.2d 529 (Utah 1973). Utah 
Court of Appeals decisions include: Charlie Brown Constr. Co., 
Inc. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1168 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
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1989. 
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Case No. 880332-CA 
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Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake City 
The Honorable David S. Young 
Attorneys: Lorin N. Pace, Salt Lake City, for Appellants. 
Henry S. Nygaard, Salt Lake City, for Respondents; 
David L. Wilkinson, Stephen G. Schwendiman, Bernard 
M. Tanner, Leonard E. McGee, Salt Lake City, for 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and Orme. 
GARFF, Judge: 
Plaintiff and appellant, Reed Maxfield, appeals the trial 
courtfs dismissal of his action against defendants and 
respondents, Owen A. and Carol Rushton, and the State of Utah, 
for failure to prosecute. We affirm the trial court's 
dismissal of his action. 
We recite only those facts pertinent to disposition of this 
appeal. 
Maxfield initially filed his complaint in this action on 
October 20, 1980, alleging that the Rushtons had wrongfully 
deprived him of his property by purchasing it through an 
illegal sheriffs sale. The Rushtons filed their answer and 
counterclaim on April 1, 1981, along with a third-party 
complaint against the State of Utah, requesting reimbursement 
of the purchase price for the property if the court should find 
in Maxfield's favor. On April 14, 1981, the State answered the 
Rushtons* third-party complaint and filed a third-party 
complaint against Mazfield. 
From October 20, 1980 until December 14, 1984, various 
motions were filed by the parties, primarily by Maxfield, 
resulting in obfuscation of the issues and protracted delay. 
Two additional factors contributed to the delay: an eighteen 
month interruption while the Rushtons were on a mission for 
their church, and a bankruptcy filing by Maxfield. 
The case remained in limbo for nearly two years as a result 
of Maxfield*s bankruptcy. Finally, on November 18, 1986, the 
Rushtons filed a certificate of readiness for trial. Ten days 
later, Maxfield objected to setting the case for trial because 
he wished to amend his complaint by adding further claims 
against the State, his discovery was incomplete, his bankruptcy 
stay was presently effective, and his new attorney needed time 
to familiarize himself with the case. Despite Maxfield's 
objections, on February 20, 1987, the bankruptcy court ordered 
that the case could be heard in district court. Thereupon, the 
State filed for an immediate trial setting. 
On March 4, 1987, Maxfield's counsel withdrew because 
Maxfield had failed to pay him. On March 20, 1987, the 
Rushtons gave Maxfield notice to obtain substitute counsel and, 
again, moved for an immediate trial setting. A hearing was 
scheduled on this motion for June 1, 1987. On May 18, 1987, 
Maxfield filed a pro s& objection to the trial setting on the 
grounds that he was incapable of handling the case himself and 
that he was in the process of seeking new counsel. 
At the June 1 hearing, the court set trial for September 
15, 1987, and scheduled a pretrial hearing on August 31, 1987. 
All discovery was to be completed prior to August 17, 1987. 
On August 10, 1987, the State certified to the court that 
it had complied with Maxfieldfs discovery requests, answered 
Maxfieldcs proposed second amended complaint, and moved for 
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summary judgment against Maxfield. Maxfield filed a motion to 
dismiss all claims by other parties against him because of his 
discharge in bankruptcy and filed an objection to the trial 
setting, requesting a two month continuance on the grounds that 
his new counsel had scheduling problems and that he intended to 
file a third amended complaint. The court scheduled a hearing 
on the State's motion for summary judgment for August 24# 1987. 
Between August 11 and 17, 1987, the parties filed more 
miscellaneous motions. On August 17, 1987, the court denied 
Maxfieldfs motion to continue the trial date or to extend 
discovery time. Thereafter, Maxfield filed a response to the 
State's motion for summary judgment, alleging insufficient 
discovery time, and filed his third amended complaint, which 
set forth a new conspiracy theory between the Rushtons and the 
State. 
On August 20, 1987, the State submitted a list of expected 
witnesses and a certificate of compliance with Maxfield's 
discovery requests. The following day, it objected to 
Maxfield1s third amended complaint. The Rushtons filed a 
similar objection. The trial court heard all the parties' 
motions on August 24, 1987, denying Maxfield's motion to file a 
third amended complaint and also the State's motion for summary 
judgment. 
At the pretrial hearing on August 31, 1987, the trial court 
again denied the parties' prior motions. Maxfield's new 
attorney moved to withdraw as counsel. The court denied 
counsel's motion to withdraw, and ordered that Maxfield's 
action be dismissed for failure to timely prosecute. Maxfield 
subsequently appealed this order. 
On appeal, Maxfield argues that the trial court erred in: 
(1) dismissing his action for failure to prosecute; (2) 
refusing to grant summary judgment in his favor; and (3) 
refusing either to void the sheriff's sale, thereby quieting 
title in his favor, or to grant him the immediate right to 
redeem the properties. 
The trial court dismissed Maxfield's cause of action, 
pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
for his "failure to timely prosecute the case."1 Such a 
1. Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b), in part, states that "[f]or failure 
of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or 
any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an 
action or of any claim against him." 
dismissal, under Rule 41(b), "operates as an adjudication upon 
the merits" of the case. 
It is well established that the trial court may, on its own 
motion, dismiss an action for want of prosecution under Rule 
41(b). Brasher Motor & Fin. Co. v. Brown. 23 Utah 2d 247, 461 
P.2d 464, 464-65 (1969); Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure 
Sports Inc.. 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). This 
authority is an "'inherent power,' governed not by rule or 
statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to 
manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and 
expeditious disposition of cases." Charlie Brown Constr. Co.. 
740 P.2d at 1370 (quoting Link v. Wabash R. Co.. 370 U.S. 626, 
630-31 (1962)). Therefore, the trial court has "a reasonable 
latitude of discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute 
if a party fails to move forward according to the rules and the 
directions of the court, without justifiable excuse." 
Westinahouse Elec. SUPPIV Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor 
Inc.. 544 P.2d 876, 878-79 (Utah 1975) (footnote omitted). 
Consequently, a lower court's dismissal of a case under Rule 
41(b) will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clear from 
the record that it has abused its discretion. Wilson v. 
Lambert. 613 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1980); Department of Social 
Servs. v. Romero. 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980); Reliance 
Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Caine. 555 P.2d 276, 277 (Utah 1976); 
Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson. 29 Utah 2d 259, 508 P.2d 528, 
529 (1973). 
A court's discretion, however, must be balanced against a 
higher priority: to "afford disputants an opportunity to be 
heard and to do justice between them." Westinghouse Elec. 
Supply Co.. 544 P.2d at 879. Thus, there is more to consider 
in determining if a dismissal for failure to prosecute is 
proper than merely the amount of time elapsed since the suit 
was filed. I&. The factors which we consider may include the 
following: (1) The conduct of both parties; (2) the 
opportunity each party has had to move the case forward; (3) 
what each of the parties has done to move the case forward; (4) 
what difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the other 
side; and (5) most important, whether injustice may result from 
the dismissal. K.L.C. Inc. v. McLean. 656 P.2d 986, 988 (Utah 
1982); Utah Oil Co. v. Harris. 565 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 
1977). 
After a thorough review of the record, we find that 
Maxfield was dilatory in prosecuting the case. After he filed 
his complaint on October 20, 1980, he amended it twice and 
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attempted to amend it yet a third time, each time adding 
additional theories of the case. He moved three times for 
summary judgment: the first time on March 11, 1981, prior to 
joinder of the State; the second time on May 30, 1984; and the 
third time on June 19, 1984, when he neglected to give adequate 
notice of the hearing to opposing counsel. He filed an 
interlocutory appeal in 1981, appealing the trial court's 
refusal to grant his first motion for summary judgment, which 
the supreme court declined to hear. He then filed a number of 
miscellaneous, primarily self-serving motions over the course 
of the proceedings, none of which served to move the case 
forward, but were/ instead/ apparent attempts to circumvent the 
denial of his motions for summary judgment. He further delayed 
prosecution of the case for nearly two years by filing for 
bankruptcy on December 10, 1984/ shortly before the case was to 
come to trial. During this bankruptcy action# he assigned his 
interest in the disputed property/ which was his major asset/ 
to a corporation which he allegedly owned and controlled as the 
primary shareholder. Further/ on the three occasions trial 
dates were set# he objected to the trial settings on the 
grounds that he wished to amend his complaint/ that he was 
involved in the bankruptcy proceeding/ and that his new counsel 
had inadequate preparation time. During the course of the 
action# he retained three different attorneys/ two of whom 
withdrew from the case because of his failure to pay them. He 
filed no certificates of readiness for trial and/ despite his 
protests as to insufficient discovery time, no motions for the 
taking of depositions. 
Although the Rushtons did not answer Maxfield's complaint 
for approximately six and one-half months after it was 
initially filed, the rest of their conduct and that of the 
State generally served to move the case along. Together, the 
Rushtons and the State filed four motions indicating their 
readiness for trial, one of which was filed almost immediately 
after the Rushtons returned from their mission. The record 
indicates that they actively pursued discovery, including the 
taking of depositions, and certified twice that they had 
complied with Maxfield's discovery requests. In contrast, they 
had to file motions twice to compel Maxfield to comply with 
their discovery requests. 
In evaluating the relevant factors, we find, first, that 
Maxfield*s conduct in prosecuting the case was dilatory while 
defendants' overall conduct served to move the case along. 
Second, although both parties were unable at times to move 
the case forward, Maxfield*s behavior was more dilatory. 
Maxfield was unable to prosecute the case while the Rushtons 
served their eighteen month mission* However, once the 
Rushtons returned, they almost immediately notified the court 
that they were ready to proceed to trial. Similarly, 
defendants were unable to prosecute the case during the 
pendency of Maxfield1s twenty-two month bankruptcy action. 
Unlike the Rushtons, however, Maxfield did not voluntarily 
inform the court that his bankruptcy action was completed and 
the case could move forward in district court, but, instead, 
objected to trial settings and waited for the State to petition 
the bankruptcy court for permission to proceed with the action. 
Third, despite his prodigious number of motions, little or 
nothing that Maxfield did after filing his initial complaint 
served to move the case along, while virtually everything that 
defendants did after the Rushtons returned home from their 
mission did. 
Fourth, defendants argue that, if we overrule the trial 
court and remand this case for hearing on the merits, they will 
be substantially prejudiced because many of their witnesses 
have either forgotten the events surrounding the controversy or 
have become unavailable in the nine years this case has been 
pending. To rebut Maxfield's assertion that he will be 
prejudiced by loss of his property interest without having had 
his day in court, defendants point out that Maxfield9s property 
interest is already assigned to a corporation in which he 
claims to have no interest. We do not find these assertions to 
be unreasonable. 
Fifth, while we recognize that injustice could result from 
dismissal of this case, in that Maxfield will lose whatever 
interest he may have in the disputed property without having 
the opportunity to argue his case on its merits, we conclude 
that he had more than ample opportunity to prove his asserted 
interest and simply failed to do so. Such nonaction is 
inexcusable, not only from the standpoint of the parties, but 
also because it constitutes abuse of the judicial process. 
In Maxfield v. Fishier. 538 P.2d 1323, 1324-25 (Utah 1975), 
the Utah Supreme Court found that the trial court justifiably 
dismissed the plaintiff's case because she had been dilatory in 
responding to the defendant's efforts at discovery, had 
resisted attempts made by the defendant to get the case to 
trial, was not ready to proceed at the time of the trial date 
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because of inexcusable neglect, and had no justification for 
continuance as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 40(b).2 We find 
that the present case is factually comparable to Maxfield v. 
Fishier and other cases which have been dismissed for failure 
to prosecute. See e.g.. Thompson Ditch Co., 508 P.2d at 528. 
We, therefore, affirm the trial court's judgment in dismissing 
Maxfield*s action. 
this issue is 
axfieltf's 
Regnal W. Garff, 
I CONOJR^ 
spositive of the case, we decline 
ning issues. Costs on appeal to 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
2. Utah R. Civ. P. 40(b) provides that, 
[u]pon motion of a party, the court may in 
its discretion, and upon such terms as may 
be just, including the payment of costs 
occasioned by such postponement, postpone 
a trial or proceeding upon good cause 
shown. If the motion is made upon the 
ground of the absence of evidence, such 
motion shall also set forth the 
materiality of the evidence expected to be 
obtained and shall show that due diligence 
has been used to procure it. The court 
may also require the party seeking the 
continuance to state, upon affidavit or 
under oath the evidence he expects to 
obtain, and if the adverse party thereupon 
admits that such evidence would be given, 
and that it may be considered as actually 
given on the trial, or offered and 
excluded as improper, the trial shall not 
be postponed upon that ground. 
ORME, Judge (concurring specially): 
Sua sponte dismissal for failure to prosecute is usually 
not appropriate except when it follows a substantial period of 
complete inactivity. It would be an extraordinary case where 
such a dismissal would be appropriate with trial scheduled in 
just a few days, especially following a flurry of motion 
activity. While the question is a closer one for me than the 
main opinion may suggest, I am persuaded this is that 
extraordinary case. 
In my view, what saves the dismissal in this case from 
crossing into the realm of abused discretion is this: 
Maxfieldfs latest counselfs motion for leave to withdraw 
coupled with his motion for leave to file yet another amended 
complaint constituted, taken together, a concession by Maxfield 
that he was nowhere near being ready to try his case in a 
matter of a few days even though the action had been pending 
for the better part of a decade. It is the length of time this 
action had been pending coupled with Maxfieldfs obvious 
unreadiness that make sua sponte dismissal appropriate in this 
case. I reiterate, however, that in the ordinary case where a 
trial date is set, potentially dispositive motions have been 
denied at a recent pretrial, and all parties are represented by 
counsel, however reluctant such representation might be, the 
appropriate course for the court is simply to try the case, 
even though earlier periods of inaction may exist. 
I also wish to comment on two aspects of the main 
opinion's analysis of the parties* comparative culpability in 
connection with the delays which plagued this case. First, the 
opinion says that "Maxfield was unable to prosecute the case 
while the Rushtons served their eighteen month mission10 and 
seems to imply that the Rushtons were likewise relieved of 
their duty to move the case along during that period. However, 
voluntary absence from the jurisdiction does not insulate a 
party from litigation nor is it a legitimate justification for 
avoiding one's own litigation obligations. This is so even 
where the reasons for the absence are well-intentioned, such as 
with the Rushtons' religious mission in this case. 
Second, the main opinion seems to blame Maxfield for a 
delay of nearly two years following his bankruptcy filing and 
to suggest that Rushtons were excused from pursuing their 
counterclaims during that time. But from all that appears, 
Maxfield's bankruptcy petition was legitimate under federal law 
and I do not see how we can fault him for taking advantage of 
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his rights under this federal scheme. That being the case, 11 
U.S.C. § 362 stayed the Rushtons and the state from pursuing 
their claims against him. Of course, this "automatic stay" 
protects the debtor from the prosecution of actions against 
him, but does not, of itself, excuse him from proceeding with 
his. actions pending against others. Nonetheless, the debtor's 
claims pending against others become the property of the 
bankruptcy estate and where the bankruptcy is one where a 
trustee is appointed, the trustee succeeds the debtor as real 
party in interest relative to those claims. The trustee enjoys 
the authority to administer the claims, i.e., pursue them, 
settle them, or abandon them as the trustee may deem 
appropriate. Thus, Maxfield may not be responsible for the 
inactivity in the instant action which followed his bankruptcy 
filing. Even if he is, the delay may be entirely legitimate 
depending on the objectives and status of the bankruptcy cases 
and the ongoing progress of liquidation or reorganization. 
Conversely, one who has an action pending against a party 
who files a bankruptcy petition—as with the Rushtons and their 
counterclaim against Maxfield—is not altogether helpless in 
the face of the bankruptcy filing. With leave of the 
bankruptcy court, as ultimately was obtained here, the claim 
can be pursued in state court at least to the point of 
liquidating the claim or, with consent of the non-bankruptcy 
party, can be adjudicated by the bankruptcy court. Depending 
on the particular case, waiting two years to request relief 
from the stay may or may not be consistent with appropriate 
diligence on the part of Rushton and the state. 
In short, lengthy delays in state court litigation, for 
which "bankruptcy" is offered up as the major excuse, should be 
carefully scrutinized. Bankruptcy is simply not the hinderance 
to the timely resolution of disputes pending in state court 
which many would have state court judges believe. 
The parties to the main action in this case sparred and 
postured for some seven years, showing little inclination to 
get their claims resolved on the merits. The system had been 
burdened long enough. Dismissal for failure to timely 
prosecute was an appropriate exercise of judicial discretion. 
Gregory J^brme, Judge 
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TITLE VI. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO COURT OF APPEALS. 
Rule 42. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of 
Court of Appeals. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a 
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be 
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah, 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.) 
Rule 43. Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discre^ 
tion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons 
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the 
court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of this 
court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that 
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of this court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled 
by this court. 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.) 
Rule 44. Certification and transmission of record; filing; 
parties. 
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and service. Counsel for the peti-
tioner shall, within the time provided by Rule 45, pay the certiorari docketing 
fee and file, with proof of service as provided by Rule 21, ten copies of a 
petition which shall comply in all respects with Rule 46. The case then will be 
placed on the certiorari docket of the court. Counsel for the petitioner shall 
serve four copies of the petition on counsel for each party separately repre-
sented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the petitioner to notify all parties in 
the case of the date of filing and of the certiorari docket number of the case. 
Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21. 
(b) Joint and separate petitions. Parties interested jointly, severally, or 
otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of certiorari; any one 
or more of them may petition separately; or any two or more of them may join 
in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be reviewed on certiorari 
and involve identical or closely related questions, it will suffice to file a single 
petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the cases. 
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rehearing or joined in the petition for rehearing) runs from the date of the 
denial of rehearing or of the entry of a subsequent decision entered upon the 
rehearing. 
(d) Time for cross-petition. 
(1) A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed: 
(A) within the time provided in Subdivisions (a) and (c) of this 
rule; or 
(B) within 30 days of the filing of the petition for a writ of certio-
rari. 
(2) Any cross-petition timely only pursuant to Paragraph (d)(1)(B) of 
this rule will not be granted unless a timely petition for a writ of certio-
rari of another party to the case is granted. 
(e) Extension of time. This court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or 
good cause, may extend the time for filing a petition or a cross-petition for a 
writ of certiorari upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration 
of the time prescribed by Paragraph (a) or (c) of this rule, whichever is appli-
cable. Any such motion which is filed before expiration of the prescribed time 
may be ex parte, unless the court otherwise requires. Notice of any such 
motion which is filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to 
the other parties. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time 
or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever 
occurs later. 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.) 
Rule 46. Petition for writ of certiorari. 
(a) Contents. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall contain, in the order 
here indicated: 
(1) A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is 
sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case in this court 
contains the names of all parties. 
(2) A table of contents with page references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, agency rules, court rules, statutes, and authorities 
cited, with references to the pages of the petition where they are cited. 
(4) The questions presented for review, expressed in the terms and 
circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement 
of the questions should be short and concise and should not be argumenta-
tive or repetitious. General conclusory statements, such as 'Hlie decision 
of the Court of Appeals is not supported by the law or facts," are not 
acceptable. The statement of a question presented will be deemed to com-
prise every subsidiary question fairly included therein. Only the ques-
tions set forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be considered 
by the court. 
(5) A reference to the official and unofficial reports of any opinions 
issued by the Court of Appeals. 
(6) A concise statement of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of this 
court is invoked, showing: 
(A) the date of the entry of the decision sought to be reviewed; 
(B) the date of the entry of any order respecting a rehearing and 
the date of the entry and terms of any order granting an extension of 
time within which to petition for certiorari; 
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(C) reliance upon Rule 44(c), where a cross-petition for a writ of 
certiorari is filed, stating the filing date of the petition for a writ of 
certiorari in connection with which the cross-petition is filed; and 
(D) the statutory provision believed to confer on this court jurisdic-
tion to review the decision in question by a writ of certiorari. 
(7) Controlling provisions of constitutions, statutes, ordinances, and 
regulations that the case involves, setting them out verbatim and giving 
the appropriate citation therefor. If the controlling provisions involved 
are lengthy, their citation alone will suffice at this point and their perti-
nent text shall be set forth in the appendix referred to in Subparagraph 
(10) of this paragraph. 
(8) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly 
the nature of the case, the course of the proceedings, and its disposition in 
the lower courts. There shall follow a statement of the facts relevant to 
the issues presented for review. All statements of fact and references to 
the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record before 
and to the opinion of the Court of Appeals. 
(9) With respect to each question presented, a direct and concise argu-
ment for the issuance of the writ. (See Rule 43.) 
(10) An appendix containing, in the following order: 
(A) copies of all opinions, including concurring and dissenting 
opinions, and all orders, including any order on rehearing, delivered 
by the Court of Appeals in rendering the decision sought to be re-
viewed; 
(B) copies of any other opinions, findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
orders, judgments, or decrees that were rendered in the case or in 
companion cases by the Court of Appeals and by other courts or by 
administrative agencies and that are relevant to the questions pre-
sented (each of those documents shall include the caption showing 
the name of the issuing court or agency, the title and number of the 
case, and the date of its entry); and 
(C) any other judicial or administrative opinions or orders that are 
relevant to the questions presented but were not entered in the case 
that is the subject of the petition. 
If the material that is required by Subparagraphs (7) and (10) of this para-
graph is voluminous, such may, if more convenient, be separately presented. 
(b) Form of petition. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall comply with 
the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27(a)(l)-(3), except that the cover of the 
petition shall be white. The clerk shall examine all petitions before filing, and 
if a petition is not prepared in accordance with Rule 27(a)(l)-(3) and this 
paragraph, it will not be filed, but shall be returned to be properly prepared. 
(c) No separate brief. All contentions in support of a petition for a writ of 
certiorari shall be set forth in the body of the petition, as provided in Subpara-
graph (a) (9) of this rule. No separate brief in support of a petition for a writ of 
certiorari will be received, and the clerk will refuse to file any petition for a 
writ of certiorari to which is annexed or appended any supporting brief. 
(d) Page limitation. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall be as short as 
possible, but may not exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the table 
of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by Subparagraph (a)(7) of 
this rule, and the appendix. 
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(e) Absence of accuracy, brevity, and clarity. The failure of a petitioner 
to present with accuracy, brevity, and clarity whatever is essential to a ready 
and adequate understanding of the points requiring consideration will be a 
sufficient reason for denying the petition. 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.) 
Rule 47. Brief in opposition; reply brief; brief of amicus 
curiae. 
(a) Brief in opposition. The respondent shall have 30 days (unless en-
larged by the court pursuant to Rule 22(b)) after service of a petition in which 
to file ten copies of an opposing brief, disclosing any matter or ground why the 
case should not be reviewed by this court. Such brief shall comply with the 
requirements of Rule 46, as applicable, and comply with the form of a brief as 
specified in Rule 27(a)(l)-(3), except that the cover of the brief shall be orange. 
The clerk shall examine all briefs before filing, and if a brief is not prepared in 
accordance with Rule 27(a)(l)-(3) and with the proper cover, it will not be 
filed, but shall be returned to be properly prepared. Four copies of the brief 
shall be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each party separately 
represented. 
(b) Page limitation. A brief in opposition shall be as short as possible and 
may not, in any single case, exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the 
table of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by Rule 46(a)(7), and 
the appendix. 
(c) Objections to jurisdiction. No motion by a respondent to dismiss a 
petition for a writ of certiorari will be received. Objections to the jurisdiction 
of the court to grant the writ of certiorari may be included in the brief in 
opposition. 
(d) Distribution of filings^ Upon the filing of a brief in opposition, the 
expiration of the time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file, 
the petition and the brief, if any, will be distributed by the clerk to the court 
for consideration. However, if a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari has been 
filed, distribution of both it and the petition for a writ of certiorari will be 
delayed until the filing of a brief in opposition by the cross-respondent, the 
expiration of the time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file. 
(e) Reply brief. A reply brief addressed to arguments first raised in the 
brief in opposition may be filed by any petitioner, but distribution under 
paragraph (d) hereof will not be delayed pending the filing of any such brief. 
Such brief shall be as short as possible, but may not exceed five pages. Such 
brief shall comply with the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27(a)(l)-(3), 
except that the cover of the brief shall be yellow. The clerk shall examine all 
briefs before filing, and if a brief is not prepared in accordance with Rule 
27(a)(l)-(3) and with the proper cover, it will not be filed, but shall be returned 
to be properly prepared Ten copies of the brief shall be filed, and four copies 
shall be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each party separately 
represented. 
(0 Brief of amicus curiae. A brief of an amicus curiae may be filed only if 
accompanied by written consent of all parties, by leave of the court granted on 
motion, or at the request of the court. A motion for leave shall identify the 
interest of the applicant and shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus 
curiae is desirable. Except as all parties otherwise consent, an amicus curiae 
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(e) Absence of accuracy, brevity, and clarity. The failure of a petitioner 
to present with accuracy, brevity, and clarity whatever is essential to a ready 
and adequate understanding of the points requiring consideration will be a 
sufficient reason for denying the petition. 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.) 
Rule 47. Brief in opposition; reply brief; brief of amicus 
curiae. 
(a) Brief in opposition. The respondent shall have 30 days (unless en-
larged by the court pursuant to Rule 22(b)) after service of a petition in which 
to file ten copies of an opposing brief, disclosing any matter or ground why the 
case should not be reviewed by this court. Such brief shall comply with the 
requirements of Rule 46, as applicable, and comply with the form of a brief as 
specified in Rule 27(a)(l)-(3), except that the cover of the brief shall be orange. 
The clerk shall examine all briefs before filing, and if a brief is not prepared in 
accordance with Rule 27(a)(l)-(3) and with the proper cover, it will not be 
filed, but shall be returned to be properly prepared. Four copies of the brief 
shall be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each party separately 
represented. 
(b) Page limitation. A brief in opposition shall be as short as possible and 
may not, in any single case, exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the 
table of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by Rule 46(a)(7), and 
the appendix. 
(c) Objections to jurisdiction. No motion by a respondent to dismiss a 
petition for a writ of certiorari will be received. Objections to the jurisdiction 
of the court to grant the writ of certiorari may be included in the brief in 
opposition. 
(d) Distribution of filings. Upon the filing of a brief in opposition, the 
expiration of the time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file, 
the petition and the brief, if any, will be distributed by the clerk to the court 
for consideration. However, if a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari has been 
filed, distribution of both it and the petition for a writ of certiorari will be 
delayed until the filing of a brief in opposition by the cross-respondent, the 
expiration of the time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file. 
(e) Reply brief. A reply brief addressed to arguments first raised in the 
brief in opposition may be filed by any petitioner, but distribution under 
paragraph (d) hereof will not be delayed pending the filing of any such brief. 
Such brief shall be as short as possible, but may not exceed five pages. Such 
brief shall comply with the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27(a)(l)-(3), 
except that the cover of the brief shall be yellow. The clerk shall examine all 
briefs before filing, and if a brief is not prepared in accordance with Rule 
27(a)(l)-(3) and with the proper cover, it will not be filed, but shall be returned 
to be properly prepared. Ten copies of the brief shall be filed, and four copies 
shall be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each party separately 
represented. 
(f) Brief of amicus curiae. A brief of an amicus curiae may be filed only if 
accompanied by written consent of all parties, by leave of the court granted on 
motion, or at the request of the court. A motion for leave shall identify the 
interest of the applicant and shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus 
curiae is desirable. Except as all parties otherwise consent, an amicus curiae 
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Rule 40. Assignment of cases for trial; continuance. 
(a) Order and precedence. The district courts shall provide by rule for 
the placing of actions upon the trial calendar (1) without request of the parties 
or (2) upon request of a party and notice to the other parties or (3) in such 
other manner as the courts may deem expedient. Precedence shall be given to 
actions entitled thereto by statute. 
(b) Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a party, the court may in 
its discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, including the payment of 
costs occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon 
good cause shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence of 
evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of the evidence 
expected to be obtained and shall show that due diligence has been used to 
procure it. The court may also require the party seeking the continuance to 
state, upon affidavit or under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and if 
the adverse party thereupon admits that such evidence would be given, and 
that it may be considered as actually given on the trial, or offered and ex-
cluded as improper, the trial shall not be postponed upon that ground. 
(c) Taking testimony of witnesses present If required by the adverse 
party, the court shall, as a condition to such postponement, proceed to have 
the testimony of any witness present taken, in the same manner as if at the 
trial; and the testimony so taken may be read on the trial with the same 
effect, and subject to the same objections that may be made with respect to a 
deposition under the provisions of Rule 32(c)(1) and (2) [Rule 32 (c)(3)(A) and 
Compiler's Notes. — Following the amend-
ment of Rule 32, effective January 1,1987, the 
reference to Rule 32(c)(1) and (2), at the end of 
Subdivision (c), should now be to Rule 
32(c)(3)(A) and (B). 
Subdivision (a) of this ruleas similar to Rule 
40, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Amendment of plead-
ings to conform to evidence, continuance upon, 
Rule 15(b). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Postponement 
—Absence of party. 
—Discretion of court. 
—Inability of counsel to attend trial. 
Unavoidable absence. 
—New theory of case. 
—Procedural delays 
—Supporting affidavits. 
—Unavailable witness. 
Lack of diligence. 
Need. 
Cited. 
Postponement 
—Absence of party. 
Continuance would not be granted because 
of absence of a party, unless he was a material 
witness, and, if so, the facts expected to be 
proved by him had to be stated under oath, 
unless the oath was waived It was also neces-
sary that party had used due diligence to be 
present at the trial McGrath v. Tallent, 7 
Utah 256, 26 P. 574 (1891). 
Refusal of trial court to postpone trial was 
not abuse of discretion where case was set 
down for trial, and had once before been con-
tinued because of absence of party who was 
principal witness, and second continuance was 
sought by attorney who was not of record in 
case Lancino v. Smith, 36 Utah 462, 105 P. 
914 (1909). 
Refusal to grant continuance in personal in-
jury case was an abuse of discretion where 
plaintiff was not able to attend the trial be-
cause of his physical condition, there was no 
evidence of malingering by the plaintiff, and 
the plaintiffs testimony was essential to his 
case. Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 
P.2d 375 (1962). 
—Discretion of court 
Denial of motion for continuance was within 
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discretion of trial court. Sharp v. Canakis 
Gianulakis, 63 Utah 249, 225 P. 337 (1924). 
Trial courts have substantial discretion in 
deciding whether to grant continuances. 
Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375 (Utah 
1988). 
—Inability of counsel to attend trial. 
The inability of counsel to be present at the 
time set for trial does not necessarily entitle 
his client to a continuance. Griffiths v. Ham-
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
Unavoidable absence. 
When counsel has made timely objections, 
given necessary notice, and has made a reason-
able effort to have the trial date changed for 
good cause, it would be an abuse of discretion 
not to grant a continuance. Griffiths v. Ham-
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
—New theory of case. 
Continuance could be obtained to develop a 
theory of the case suggested after issue joined 
and before trial. Tiernan v. Trewick, 2 Utah 
393 (1877). 
—Procedural delays. 
Court properly denied motion for contin-
uance in action based on credit card obligation 
which had been procedurally delayed for two 
and a half years by interrogatories and by vari-
ous motions of the defendant; and although 
trial date had been set for four months, motion 
for continuance was not filed until nine days 
before trial. First Sec. Bank v. Johnson, 540~ 
P.2d 521 (Utah 1975). 
—Supporting affidavits. 
Subdivision (b) does not require affidavits to 
accompany a motion for continuance. Bairas v. 
Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375 (1962). 
—Unavailable witness. 
Lack of diligence. 
Where subpoena for absent witness was not 
placed in hands of an officer for service until 
the morning the case was called for trial, 
though it had been set for several weeks, and 
the witness had testified at a former trial, con-
tinuance was denied. Corporation of Members 
of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
v. Watson, 30 Utah 126, 83 P. 731 (1906). 
In malpractice action, motion for contin-
uance based on plaintiffs inability to serve 
subpoena on vacationing medical witness was 
properly denied, where plaintiff had made no 
effort to depose witness and had never con-
tacted witness for the purpose of testifying. 
Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 
1975). 
Need. 
Where the defendant's counsel had three 
weeks to prepare for trial, and where two of the 
witnesses, purportedly important to his case, 
were actually present at trial and thus subject 
to cross-examination, the purely speculative 
need for a third witness did not entitle the de-
fendant to the granting of a motion for contin-
uance. State v. Humpherys, 707 P.2d 109 
(Utah 1985). 
Cited in Thorley v. Thorley, 579 P.2d 927 
<Utah 1978). _ 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 17 Am. Jur. 2d Continuance ness in civil case, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272. 
§§ 1 to 26,43 to 53; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial §§ 25, 
26. 
C.J.S. — 17 C J.S. Continuances § 1 et seq.; 
88 CJ.S. Trial §§ 18 to 35. 
A.L.R. — Admissions to prevent contin-
uance sought to secure testimony of absent wit-
Continuance of civil case as conditioned 
upon applicant's payment of costs or expenses 
incurred by other party, 9 A.L.R.4th 1144. 
Key Numbers. — Continuance « = l e t seq.; 
Trial «= 1 to 7. 
Rule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule 
23(c), of Rule 66, and of any applicable statute, an action may be dis-
missed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of 
dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or 
of a motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismis-
sal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless other-
wise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is with-
out prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any 
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court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including 
the same claim. 
(2) By order of court Except as provided in Paragraph (1) of this 
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs 
instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions 
as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defen-
dant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the 
action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the 
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the 
court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this 
paragraph is without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to 
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may 
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, 
in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation 
of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in 
the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground 
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The 
court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment 
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of 
all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the 
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the 
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indis-
pensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The 
provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, 
or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to 
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive 
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at 
the trial or hearing. 
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has once 
dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon or including 
the same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such order 
for the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem 
proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has 
complied with the order. 
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. Should a 
party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a provisional remedy has been 
allowed such party, the bond or undertaking filed in support of such provi-
sional remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse party 
against whom such provisional remedy was obtained. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially similar to Rule 41, F.RC.P. 
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FILE NO. C *Q- F/& -7 
LE: {' PARTIES PRESENT) COUNSEL* (•» COUNSEL PRESENT) 
-ftp,Q -n\n-]i/.tn 
MA 
M-. truu^to-. C£ruu^^J>_ 
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yArXk±KP<yJ'i />V. . . 
"BEST 
"tePOAiM" 
HON.. 
DATE: 
I A I L W 
C&/ OAj'zst. dfcat 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED CASE COMES NOW ON REGULARLY BEFORE THE COURT FOR 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE. COUNSEL APPEARING AS NOTED ABOVE. 
WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING ISSUES ARE DISCUSSED BETWEEN RESPECTIVE COUNSEL 
ND THE COURT. THE COURT NOW ORDERS THE ABOVE ENTITLED CASE BE SET FOR THE 
FOLLOWING (SEE BELOW) OR SETTLED. . 
DATE TIKE 
(1) DISCOVERY CUT-OFF DATE 
(2) MOTIONS 
(3) DATE FOR PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
(A) LENGTH OF TRIAL JURY OR NON-JURY 
(5) TRIAL DATE S^.^i.^O <//$/* 7 
(6) SETTLEMENT 
js&-
JD, VhA . 1{viQa*£) in Pi// 
000437 
HENRY S. NYGAARD, ESQ. (Bar No. 2435) 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
Attorneys for Owen A. Rushton and Carol Rushton 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
REED MAXFIELD AND UTAH'S 
GREAT GAME PRESERVE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON, CAROL RUSHTON, 
et al, 
Defendants. 
J U D G M E N T 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL 
RUSHTON, 
Third Party 
Plaintiffs , 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
Utah State Department of Social 
Services, 
Third Party Defendant 
and Third Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REED MAXFIELD, 
Third Party Defendant. 
Civil No. C80-8167 
Judge: David Young 
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This matter came on for pre-trial conference on Monday/ 
August 31, 1987, at 2:00 o'clock p.m. by order of the court. 
Personal appearances were entered by the plaintiff, Reed Maxfield; 
plaintiff's counsel, Charles C. Brown and Jeffrey B. Brown; 
defendants Rushtons' counsel, Henry S. Nygaard; and counsel for 
State of Utah, namely: Steven Schwendiman, Bernard Tanner and 
Leonard McGee. The plaintiff, Reed Maxfield, and his legal 
counsel argued that the issues of the Second Amended Complaint 
included those set forth in plaintiff's proposed Third Amended 
Complaint, a 1983 civil rights cause of action, and that Steven 
Schwendiman be designated as a John Doe defendant. Plaintiff's 
counsel moved that they be allowed to withdraw upon the grounds 
that plaintiff has not consummated a fee agreement with counsel; 
counsel for the defendants Rushton and the State of Utah argued 
that all relevant issues were set forth in plaintiff's Second 
Amended Complaint and the defendants' responsive pleadings includ-
ing their Answers, Crossclaims, and Counterclaims. 
The court, after reviewing the pleadings and exhibits on 
file, having heard arguments from the plaintiff personally, and 
counsel for all the parties, and being fully advised in the 
premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff's causes of action be dismissed for fail-
ure to timely prosecute. 
-2- APPENDIX H-2 
2. Rights of redemption shall commence to run upon exe-
cution of this Judgment. 
3. Defendants are awarded costs. 
DATED this 3^ day of 5 ^ H ^ 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BROWN, SMITH & HANNA 
Judge 
tj J^JL ^ w h^^i 
3qe tfavid Younq ? tT 
By: 
Charles C. Brown 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH 
Bertnara Tanner7 
Assistant Attornfe$_General 
Counsel for State of Utah 
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OCT 05 1987 
Of/ice of ATTORNEY GENERAL HENRY S. NYGAARD, ESQ. (Bar No. 2435) 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
Attorneys for Owen A. Rushton and Carol Rushton 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
REED MAXFIELD AND UTAH'S 
GREAT GAME PRESERVE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON, CAROL RUSHTON, 
et al, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL 
RUSHTON, 
Third Party 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
Utah State Department of Social 
Services, 
Third Party Defendant 
and Third Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REED MAXFIELD, 
Third Party Defendant. 
Civil No. C80-8167 
Judge: David Young 
i\ nornriTV T — 1 
TO ALL PARTIES: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Judgment was entered in 
favor the defendants on the 30th day of September, 1987, by the 
Honorable David Young. A copy of the Judgment is attached. 
DATED this £ day of October, 1987. 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
By: 
37/Ny^aar HenrysTTNyga d 
Attorney for Defendants Owen A. 
Rushton and Carol Rushton 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS: 
County of Salt Lake ) 
MARGARET A. NELSON, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of Beaslin, Nygaard, 
Coke & Vincent, attorneys for defendants Owen A. and Carol 
Rushton herein; that she served the attached NOTICE OF ENTRY OF 
JUDGMENT upon: 
Bernard Tanner, Esq. 
Asst. Attorney General 
130 State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Mr. Reed Maxfield 
410 East 7620 South 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Charles C. Brown, Esq. 
Jeffrey B. Brown, Esq. 
Brown, Smith & Hanna 
City Centre I, Suite 401 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and 
depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
the 3^ day of October, 1987. 
Hargatfet A. Nelson 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 
October, 1987. 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, UT 
My Commission Expires: 
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